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RESCUING THE RESCUER: REFORMING HOW FLORIDA’S 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW TREATS MENTAL INJURY 
OF FIRST RESPONDERS 
Travis J. Foels* ** 
Abstract 
The 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida was the 
deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since the September 11 
attacks in 2001. With a final death toll of forty-nine people, and fifty-
three others wounded, the attack sent shockwaves throughout the city, 
state, and nation. People sent condolences to the families of those 
affected, prayers for those taken, and praise to first responders and health 
care professionals for their hard work and service. What many fail to 
consider, however, is the lasting effect such a horrific and traumatic event 
can have on the first responders whose job it is to pick up the pieces after 
attackers rip the world apart. 
This Note begins by discussing the struggle of Gerry Realin, one of 
the police officers tasked with removing the bodies of the slain after the 
shooting. Officer Realin was deeply affected by the experience, and is 
currently in a fight with the state of Florida to have his PTSD covered by 
workers’ compensation. Under current Florida law, first responders who 
experience psychological trauma on the job are not entitled to paid days 
off or to have their medical bills reimbursed by their employer, absent an 
accompanying physical injury. This Note argues that the current Florida 
workers’ compensation statutory scheme results in unfairness to first 
responders, a class of people who put their lives on the line and frequently 
risk exposure to dangerous and highly stressful events. In addition, this 
Note addresses the constitutional arguments against such laws and 
proposes legislative changes necessary to remedy this injustice. 
Unfortunately, horrific events such as the Pulse shooting are seemingly 
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becoming more frequent, and legislators need to reevaluate the effect 
these laws have on the men and women tasked with keeping our society 
safe.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 12, 2016, Orlando Police Department Officer Gerry Realin 
received a phone call at 8:30 a.m. informing him that he and his seven-
2
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man hazmat team were to report for duty.1 At first, Officer Realin thought 
the call would be routine: assisting the FBI with collecting evidence, 
conducting a meth-lab raid, or cleaning up a drug bust—common duties 
assigned to hazmat team officers.2 Instead, Officer Realin and his team 
were tasked with collecting the forty-nine bodies of deceased victims of 
a shooting that had occurred in a local nightclub just a few hours prior.3 
This shooting would be the nation’s deadliest mass shooting in history, 
and worst terror attack since September 11, 2001.4 Officer Realin and his 
team worked nearly around the clock,5 carrying out their inconceivable 
task with dignity. They refused to let any other officers assist them with 
removing the bodies so that fewer people had to witness the horrific scene 
that lay behind the club doors.6  
Other Orlando first responders recounted the horrific sight as a lone 
gunman opened fire on the unsuspecting club-goers. Julio Salgado, an 
EMT who arrived on scene shortly after the attack began, described “rows 
of wounded bodies” and “[p]atrons . . . running out of the building with 
open wounds, trying to escape.”7 As responding police officers entered 
the club, they were met with “chaos and darkness,” the only light in the 
building emanating eerily from a lone disco ball, revealing a dance floor 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Mike Holfeld, Pulse First Responder Still Having Nightmares, Flashbacks, WKMG 
CLICKORLANDO (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/pulse-orlando-
shooting/opd-first-responder-i-can-still-see-all-the-blood.  
 2. Christopher Brennan, Orlando First Responder Cannot Claim PTSD on Workers’ 
Comp, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016, 7:32 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
national/orlando-responder-claim-ptsd-workers-comp-article-1.2762932; Holfeld, supra note 1; 
see also HAZMAT Team, SAFEOPEDIA, https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/1114/hazmat-team 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (defining a hazmat team as “an organized group of 
professionals . . . specially trained to handle hazardous materials or dangerous goods”). 
 3. Brennan, supra note 2. 
 4. Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS Allegiance, CNN 
(June 13, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/; see 
also Wm. Robert Johnston, Worst Terrorist Strikes in the United States, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE 
(Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255us.html (listing the Pulse 
nightclub shooting as the fifth deadliest domestic terror attack of any kind in the past century). 
This Note was written prior to the horrific shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada on October 1, 2017 in 
which fifty-eight people were killed and at least 500 more were injured. Holly Yan et al., Las 
Vegas Shooting: Bodycam Footage Shows First Response, CNN (Oct. 7, 2017, 2:36 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/us/las-vegas-shooting-investigation/index.html. 
 5. Field Sutton, Orlando Police Officer Has PTSD; Could Lose Everything Because of 
State Loophole, WFTV (Aug. 19, 2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.wftv.com/news/local/orlando-
police-officer-has-ptsd-could-lose-everything-because-of-state-loophole/426684791. 
 6. Abe Aboraya, The Politics of PTSD After Pulse First Responder Goes Public with 
Diagnosis, WMFE (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.wmfe.org/the-politics-of-ptsd-after-pulse-first-
responder-goes-public-with-diagnosis/64137. 
 7. Morgan Winsor et al., After Orlando Shooting, First Responders Grapple with 
Psychological Toll, ABC NEWS (June 21, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ 
orlando-shooting-responders-grapple-psychological-toll/story?id=39992495. 
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covered in blood and bullet casings.8 One of the most haunting 
descriptions from a first responder involved “a symphony of familiar 
ringtones . . . each ring [signifying the] families of the 
dead . . . desperately trying to reach their loved ones after learning of the 
mass shooting.”9 The brave men and women who worked tirelessly that 
night will forever be haunted by what they experienced.  
Officer Realin and several other Orlando first responders who 
answered the call that night have since been diagnosed with PTSD.10 
Officer Realin suffers from hypertension, nightmares, loss of sleep, and 
flashbacks to the event.11 He is currently under the care of a psychologist, 
psychiatrist, and cardiologist, and has been hospitalized for hypertension 
since the incident.12 He returned to work two weeks after the shooting, 
but after passing out on the job he began calling in sick, using his 
department-given sick days to recover.13 Due to his symptoms, Officer 
Realin’s psychiatrist placed him on “no work” status and told him that he 
should not return to work due to his debilitating flashbacks and 
nightmares.14 Before long, Officer Realin depleted all of his vacation time 
and sick days, and the department placed him on paid leave.15 Although 
he is currently receiving paid leave from the Orlando Police Department, 
Officer Realin and his family are worried that the financial assistance 
may stop at any time.16 This worry stems from the fact that, while 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id.; see also Jim Ash, Lawmakers Searching for a Workers’ Comp Cure, WUSF NEWS 
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/post/lawmakers-searching-workers-comp-
cure#stream/0 (“Relin [sic] stood for hours in pools of human blood to remove bodies from the 
Pulse nightclub.”). 
 9. Caitlin Doornbos, First Responders ‘Resilient,’ Coping After Pulse Shooting, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (June 25, 2016), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-nightclub-
shooting/os-shooting-first-responder-cope-20160624-story.html. 
 10. Frances Robles, Orlando Officers Grapple with Trauma and Red Tape After Massacre, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/orlando-shooting-
police.html (offering officer accounts of struggling to return to work in the aftermath of the Pulse 
shooting). 
 11. Bob Kealing, Local Lawmaker: Time to Re-draft First Responder Workers’ 
Compensation Laws, WESH 2 NEWS (Sept. 26, 2016, 7:19 PM), http://www.wesh.com/news/ 
local-lawmaker-time-to-redraft-first-responder-workers-compensation-laws/41839516.  
 12. Joe Startz on behalf of Gerry Realin, Officer Realin Support Fund, GOFUNDME (Aug. 
17, 2016), https://www.gofundme.com/officergerryrealin. 
 13. Cody Gohl, Pulse First Responder Is in Danger of Losing His Job, NEWNOWNEXT 
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.newnownext.com/pulse-nightclub-first-responder-ptsd/08/2016/ 
?device=1#openuserprofile=4ccfd80303d8cf4c000103d8cf4c. 
 14. Brennan, supra note 2; Holfeld, supra note 1. 
 15. Nico Lang, Florida Denies Pulse First Responder Workers’ Comp for PTSD, 
ADVOCATE (Aug. 23, 2016, 11:55 AM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2016/8/23/florida-
denies-pulse-first-responder-workmans-comp-ptsd. 
 16. Christopher Brennan, Orlando First Responder with PTSD Pushes for Mental Health 
Care, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
national/bill-push-post-orlando-responder-ptsd-coverage-article-1.2801332. Since the spring of 
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physical injuries and mental injury that results from physical injury are 
fully covered by workers’ compensation laws in Florida, purely mental 
injuries are not.17 
Current Florida workers’ compensation statutes differentiate between 
mental injuries accompanied by a compensable physical injury and 
injuries that are purely mental in nature that are unaccompanied by a 
physical injury.18 For purely mental injury, also known as mental–mental 
injury,19 current statutes do not provide a right for first responders to 
receive indemnification,20 such as recouped vacation and sick leave, 
reimbursement for medical treatment received prior to the compensation 
claim, paid days off, or lost wages.21 Therefore, while Officer Realin is 
entitled to continue to have his medical treatment paid for by the police 
department, they are under no obligation to reimburse him for any prior 
medical expenses or time missed, or to continue to pay his salary.22 A 
spokesperson for the police department stated that Officer Realin can 
apply for compensation through the department’s disability committee, 
and if he can prove that his injury inhibited his ability to work and was 
suffered on the job, his time could be reimbursed.23 However, Officer 
Realin and his attorney argue that this process typically adheres to the 
protocols set forth by the state workers’ compensation statutes.24 
Compensation through that channel is therefore far from certain, and is 
often subject to lengthy bureaucratic struggles.25 Faced with the 
                                                                                                                     
2017 when this Note was completed, the Orlando Police Department stopped paying Officer 
Realin, but he was ultimately approved for early retirement benefits by the police pension board. 
Christal Hayes, Orlando Police Stops Paying Cop with PTSD After Pulse: ‘Where Is Orlando 
United Now?’, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 30, 2017, 11:15 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/ 
news/pulse-orlando-nightclub-shooting/os-gerry-realin-pulse-orlando-police-20170630-story.html; 
David Harris, Pension Board Approves Early Retirement for Orlando Police Officer with PTSD 
After Pulse, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 13, 2017 (July 13, 2017, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-gerry-realin-pension-20170713-story.html. 
 17. FLA. STAT. § 112.1815 (2017); id. § 440.093. 
 18. § 112.1815. 
 19. Adam Tucker, How Denying Mental-Mental Claims Frustrates the Central Purposes of 
Workers’ Compensation Law, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 470 (2010). 
 20. § 112.1815(2)(a)(3). 
 21. Lang, supra note 15; Workers’ Compensation, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Workers’+Compensation (last visited June 21, 2016) 
(describing generally what falls under the category of “indemnity benefits” in the realm of 
workers’ compensation law). 
 22. Holfeld, supra note 1. 
 23. Gohl, supra note 13. 
 24. Id. For example, section 112.1815, as previously discussed, flatly denies 
indemnification for first responder mental injury that is unaccompanied by physical injury. It 
follows then, that if a committee looked to this statute for guidance in determining compensability 
of an injury, it would ultimately deny coverage. 
 25. Robles, supra note 10 (citing how two officers described “weekslong [sic] bureaucratic 
struggles” to obtain financial support as their employer attempted to “patch together resources”). 
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uncertainty of whether he will continue to receive financial support, 
Officer Realin has resorted to creating a GoFundMe account in an effort 
to elicit donations.26 Unsurprisingly, the added stress of not knowing 
whether he will be able to continue supporting his family financially has 
only augmented the stress and anguish caused by the shooting.27  
It is estimated that more than 100,000 officers across the country 
suffer from PTSD, many of whom find themselves in a similar situation 
to Officer Realin.28 Currently, eighteen states, including Florida, refuse 
to recognize purely psychological trauma unaccompanied by a physical 
injury as a compensable injury eligible for full workers’ compensation 
benefits.29 Officer Realin and his attorney are actively advocating for a 
change in the current Florida workers’ compensation law that would 
provide long-term disability payments if he is unable to return to his job 
for an indefinite period of time.30 The brave men and women who serve 
as first responders dedicate their lives to protecting others. As part of that 
dedication, they risk finding themselves in traumatic circumstances that 
may leave a lasting impact on them psychologically. Unfortunately, the 
pain of witnessing highly traumatic events stays with these men and 
women long after the last rescue has been made or the last body has been 
removed.31 Recently, tragic attacks such as the Pulse shooting are 
occurring with more and more frequency,32 providing more opportunities 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id.; Joe Startz, supra note 12. 
 27. Brennan, supra note 16; Robles, supra note 10 (“‘Not knowing if my kids are going to 
have health insurance or [if] we’re going to get a paycheck to pay the bills, just not knowing the 
financial future is a real stress,’ Officer Realin said. ‘I don’t know what’s going to happen. 
Nothing is resolved.’”). 
 28. See Lang, supra note 15; see also Pamela Kulbarsh, 2015 Police Suicide Statistics, 
OFFICER.COM (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.officer.com/article/12156622/2015-police-suicide-
statistics (estimating that roughly 15–18% of police officers, about 150,000 nationally, suffer from 
post-traumatic stress). It is also believed that this figure might be less than the actual number of 
law enforcement officers struggling with PTSD, due to underreporting and unwillingness to seek 
help. Kulbarsh, supra. 
 29. Ashley R. Bailey, Stress Is [Not] Part of the Job: Finding the Appropriate Balance 
Between Fairness and Efficiency to Compensate Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Under Workers’ 
Compensation Statutes, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 507, 518. Those states are: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 
518 n.82. 
 30. Kealing, supra note 11.  
 31. Kulbarsh, supra note 28 (citing research that indicates that as many as 1/3 of active and 
retired law enforcement officers suffer from PTSD, some of whom do not even realize they suffer 
from the disorder). 
 32. See Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Confirms a Sharp Rise in Mass Shootings Since 2000, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/25shooters.html?_r=0 
(“There were, on average, 16.4 such shootings a year from 2007 to 2013, compared with an 
average of 6.4 shootings annually from 2000 to 2006. In the past 13 years, 486 people have been 
killed in such shootings, with 366 of the deaths in the past seven years.”); see also Tanya Basu, 
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for first responder exposure to circumstances that may cause a lasting, 
negative effect on their psychological well-being. The Pulse tragedy has 
called attention to the increased need for Florida legislators to amend 
current law and allow first responders to receive full compensation for 
legitimate, purely mental injuries. Doing so honors the service of 
dedicated first responders and provides them with the compensation and 
financial assurance they both require and deserve.  
Part I of this Note will address PTSD generally, as well as the give-
and-take bargain that the workers’ compensation system embodies. Part 
II describes the current posture of Florida’s workers’ compensation law, 
referencing both statutes and illustrative case law to better explain how 
Florida treats mental injuries. Part III demonstrates how such a 
categorical denial of indemnification for first responders’ purely mental 
injuries is unconstitutional, and argues that evidentiary and floodgate 
concerns do not outweigh the need to compensate legitimate injury. 
Lastly, Part IV proposes a model statute to be adopted by the Florida 
legislature, and offers a methodology for mental injury claim evaluation 
to ease whatever burden courts may feel after allowing such claims into 
the courtroom.  
I.  BACKGROUND: PTSD GENERALLY & THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
QUID PRO QUO 
To fully comprehend the gravity of Officer Realin’s mental injury, 
and to understand why Florida’s legislature has been hesitant to 
compensate purely mental injuries, it is helpful to have a general 
understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder, commonly known as 
PTSD. Additionally, it is important to note that workers’ compensation 
law is entirely state specific. Each state legislature weighs pros and cons 
in deciding what laws to enact and what injuries to compensate to best 
serve the overarching workers’ compensation goal. A basic 
understanding of this overall goal will assist with fully understanding 
why that goal is frustrated by current Florida statutes.  
A.  PTSD Generally 
While PTSD is far from new, it was officially recognized by the 
American Psychiatric Association in 1980 after people took note of 
Vietnam War veterans’ struggles to cope with their experiences from 
battle after returning home.33 When faced with extreme sensory overload 
                                                                                                                     
This Chart Shows How Mass Public Shootings in the U.S. Have Risen, TIME (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://time.com/3983557/mass-shootings-america-increasing/ (depicting graphically how the 
average rate of mass public shootings has risen from a 1.1 incidence rate in the 1970s to about 4.5 
incidences per year between 2010 and 2013). 
 33. Nicholas B. Haynes, Indecisiveness in Compensating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: 
Where Does Illinois Leave First Responders?, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 154 (2009). 
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and stress, like the stressful combat situations faced by the soldiers in 
Vietnam, the human brain responds by generating what is known as the 
“fight or flight” response.34 Adrenaline, cortisol, and norepinephrine 
flood your brain and your heart rate increases.35 This, in turn, increases 
the amount of blood pumped to extremities and muscles, elevates your 
blood pressure, and provides a surge of energy that focuses your 
attention, allowing you to deal with the emergency situation.36 But what 
happens after the body returns to its normal state? As hormones level off 
and bodily functions return to normal, you are left to process the events 
you have just experienced. Most people recover from the initial 
symptoms of the fight-or-flight response naturally,37 but for others 
returning to a state of normalcy is not that simple. For some, exposure to 
trauma such as combat, domestic violence, rape, sexual abuse, burns, 
disasters, violent crime, terrorist attacks, or other significant, stressful 
events can result in PTSD.38  
PTSD is “a psychological reaction that occurs after experiencing a 
highly stressing event . . . outside the range of normal human 
experience . . . that is usually characterized by depression, anxiety, 
flashbacks, recurrent nightmares, and avoidance of reminders of the 
event.”39 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th 
ed. (DSM-V) lists the criteria considered when making a PTSD 
diagnosis.40 According to the DSM-V, the “essential feature of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the development of characteristic 
symptoms following exposure to one or more traumatic events.”41 PTSD 
can result from “[e]xposure to actual or threatened death, . . . [d]irectly 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Stress Effects on the Body, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (2016), http://www.apa.org/ 
helpcenter/stress-body.aspx. 
 35. Sarah Klein, Adrenaline, Cortisol, Norepinephrine: The Three Major Stress Hormones, 
Explained, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2013, 8:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/04/19/adrenaline-cortisol-stress-hormones_n_3112800.html (explaining what each of these 
stress hormones are, where they are produced from, and what effect each of them has on the 
human body). 
 36. Id.; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 34. 
 37. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd/index.shtml. 
 38. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and 
Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 10 (2001); 
see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
271–80 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V], https://psicovalero.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/ 
dsm-v-manual-diagnc3b3stico-y-estadc3adstico-de-los-trastornos-mentales.pdf (describing the 
diagnostic criteria used in diagnosing PTSD, the stressors known to cause PTSD, diagnostic 
features of the disorder, prevalence, and risks associated with the disorder). 
 39. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/post-traumatic%20stress%20disorder (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 40. DSM-V, supra note 38, at 271–72.  
 41. Id. at 274. 
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experiencing [a] traumatic event(s) . . . [or] [e]xperiencing repeated or 
extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s).”42 The 
DSM-V even cites as an example of a traumatic event “first responders 
collecting human remains.”43 Additionally, the other criteria necessary 
for a PTSD diagnosis include (1) the presence of one or more “intrusion 
symptoms” associated with the causative event;44 (2) “[d]issociative 
reactions” or flashbacks; (3) “[p]ersistent avoidance of stimuli associated 
with the event”; (4) negative alterations in mood; (5) “alterations in 
arousal and reactivity” associated with the event (such as “[i]rritable 
behavior and angry outbursts,” “[h]ypervigilence,” or “[s]leep 
disturbance”); (6) the duration of the aforementioned criteria lasting 
longer than one month; and the requirement that (7) the symptoms cause 
“significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.”45 
Symptoms of PTSD can include re-experiencing the trauma, avoiding 
situations or activities reminiscent of the original trauma, hypervigilance, 
and health problems such as hypertension.46 Essentially, an individual 
with PTSD suffers from a persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic 
event; “[e]very time the traumatic event is recollected, it triggers a 
physiological arousal and stress response, intense fear, and anxiety of the 
event.”47 PTSD victims can spend their lives running from triggers that 
cause them to slip back into the painful memory of the traumatic event. 
“A color, a light, a sound, a word, almost anything can trigger a reminder 
of that feared incident, causing the same response every time, reliving the 
entire event” from memory.48 The fear, pain, helplessness, and all of the 
physical reactions that accompanied the initial event, are all re-
experienced.49 Fortunately, since 1980 PTSD has become more widely 
recognized and understood by our society, and the number of individuals 
who have been successfully diagnosed and treated for PTSD continues to 
increase every year.50 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 271. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. Intrusion symptoms are further defined to include “recurrent, involuntary, and 
intrusive distressing memories” of the traumatic event; “recurrent distressing dreams” related to 
the event; flashbacks in which the individual feels or acts as though the event is recurring; and 
intense psychological distress when exposed to “cues” that symbolize the event. Id. 
 45. Id. at 271–72. 
 46. Id. at 272, 275; Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 14, 16. 
 47. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 16–17. 
 48. Id. at 17. For Officer Realin, some of those triggers include Sharpies, face masks, and 
San Francisco 49ers jerseys; “Sharpies because of the markers the authorities used to put the 
names of the victims on a board. Masks for the one he wore that day to keep blood off his face. 
Forty-nine for the number of people who were killed.” Robles, supra note 10. 
 49. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 17. 
 50. Haynes, supra note 33, at 154 (noting that one of the reasons PTSD has become more 
prevalent in recent years is due to the number of soldiers returning from Iraq who suffer from 
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B.  Workers’ Compensation Purpose and the Quid Pro Quo 
Workers’ compensation law functions in a unique fashion. Since its 
genesis, it has been legislated with no federal involvement and is 
therefore the product of absolute state authority.51 States possess the right 
to decide the framework and standards they believe best benefit their 
citizens and what injuries they believe should be compensable under 
those standards.52 The driving philosophy behind workers’ compensation 
law is “belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most 
dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the 
victims of work-connected injuries.”53 By design, the workers’ 
compensation system functions as a type of quid pro quo: it is a “no-
fault”54 system where employers are shielded from excessive liability by 
predetermined sums to be paid when an employee files a claim for a 
work-related injury.55 In exchange for employer limited liability, the 
employee is guaranteed some (typically modest) compensation for 
waiving their right to pursue the action in civil court, and benefits from a 
streamlined system well accustomed to handling workers’ compensation 
claims.56  
In Florida, the legislative intent of workers’ compensation law is 
codified in Florida Statutes section 440.015. The statute states that the 
                                                                                                                     
PTSD symptoms); PTSD Statistics, PTSD UNITED, http://www.ptsdunited.org/ptsd-statistics-2/ 
(last visited June 21, 2017) (“In the past year alone the number of diagnosed cases in the military 
jumped 50%.”); see generally Jaimie L. Gradus, Epidemiology of PTSD, U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERAN’S AFF., http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/PTSD-overview/epidemiological-facts-
ptsd.asp (last visited May 17, 2017) (describing studies conducted to evaluate the prevalence of 
PTSD in men, women, adolescents, and other members of the community). 
 51. Logan Burke, Note, Finding a Way Out of No Man’s Land: Compensating Mental-
Mental Claims and Bringing West Virginia’s Workers’ Compensation System into the 21st 
Century, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 889, 890 (2015).  
 52. Tucker, supra note 19, at 468. 
 53. Bailey, supra note 29, at 513 (quoting 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender ed.)). German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who 
passed the first compensation law in 1884, believed a system where employees agree not to sue 
when they are injured and employers agree to pay medical bills and lost wages would serve could 
be a way to humanize the industrial revolution. Ash, supra note 8; Burke, supra note 51, at 891. 
 54. Workers’ compensation is a no-fault system because “negligence and fault are largely 
immaterial, both in the sense that the employee’s contributory negligence does not lessen his or 
her rights and in the sense that the employer’s complete freedom from fault does not lessen its 
liability.” Bailey, supra note 29, at 513; see also  LARSON, supra note 53, § 1.02 (“[T]he right to 
benefits and amount of benefits are based largely on a social theory of providing support and 
preventing destitution, rather than settling accounts between two individuals according to their 
personal deserts or blame.”). 
 55. Burke, supra note 51, at 895. 
 56. Id. at 890–91; LARSON, supra note 53, § 1.01 (stating that the injured employee is 
“automatically entitled to certain benefits whenever the employee suffers a ‘personal injury by 
accident arising out of and in the course of employment,’” and in exchange, “give[s] up [his or 
her] common-law right to sue the employer for damages for any injury covered by the act”). 
10
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assurance of “quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical 
benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to 
gainful employment” is the primary goal of workers’ compensation law.57 
Additionally, “[i]t is the specific intent of the Legislature that workers’ 
compensation cases shall be decided on their merits.”58 Furthermore, 
Florida Statutes section 440.11 codifies the exclusive liability provision, 
stating that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in [the workers’ 
compensation statutes] shall be exclusive and in place of all other 
liability.”59 In light of these statutes, it is certainly curious how a blanket 
denial of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for first responders 
with PTSD or other purely mental injuries furthers these explicitly stated 
legislative intentions.  
Workers’ compensation functions like a contractual agreement 
between employer and employee, with both sides making concessions to 
avoid the cost and unpredictability that inevitably accompanies civil tort 
claims.60 However, for this system to work, the employee must have 
adequate compensation for her injury. If she does not, what benefit does 
she gain from the agreement? For first responders who sustain physical 
injury in Florida, the compromise is arguably fair. Physically injured 
employees benefit from the no-fault system and are typically provided 
with full compensation for legitimate claims.61 Employees with purely 
mental injuries, however, do not receive the same consideration, and are 
effectively left in limbo. First responders who sustain purely mental 
injury have essentially signed away their right to pursue full 
compensation for their injury in civil court. Without the provision of 
indemnification through the avenue of workers’ compensation 
reimbursement, those injured first responders are left without recourse.  
II.  FLORIDA’S CURRENT WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 
The Florida Statutes that govern the delivery of workers’ 
compensation benefits for a typical injured employee completely bar 
claims for purely mental injury.62 However, several years ago an 
exception was created for first responders, allowing firefighters, 
                                                                                                                     
 57. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2017). 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. § 440.11. For a general discussion about the “Exclusiveness Rule” of workers’ 
compensation, see 9 LARSON, supra note 53, § 100.01. 
 60. As Logan Burke points out, the agreement stricken by employer and employee is 
paradoxical. Both sides make themselves more vulnerable while simultaneously better 
safeguarding themselves from financial injury. Employees benefit from guaranteed payments, yet 
give up the right to sue in tort in exchange. Employers promise to provide employees with certain 
benefits irrespective of employer fault, and in exchange are insulated from the possibility of 
excessive tort judgments. Burke, supra note 51, at 892.  
 61. § 440.093; id. § 112.1815. 
 62. § 440.093(1). 
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paramedics, EMTs, and law enforcement officers to bring claims for 
mental injury unaccompanied by any sort of physical injury.63 
Confoundingly, the legislature stopped short of providing full coverage. 
Despite recognizing that first responder mental injuries can and do exist, 
the legislature decided to limit recovery to only medical benefits, 
explicitly excluding the provision of indemnification.64 During the 2017 
legislative session, a handful of bills were proposed in both the Florida 
House and Senate that, if passed, would amend or replace current law and 
provide both medical and indemnity benefits to first responders.65 
However, the bills failed to progress through the requisite legislative 
subcommittees in time, and died when the 2017 session ended.66 In 
analyzing the issues created by the distinction between types of mental 
injury and provision of some benefits but not others, a brief review of the 
current Florida Statutes and illustrative case law is helpful. In addition, it 
is important to note that although such laws distinguish between 
employees with different injuries and limitations, there is no direct 
conflict with the Americans with Disabilities Act.67  
A.  Florida’s Mental or Nervous Disorders and First 
Responder Statutes 
Florida Statutes sections 440.093 and 112.1815 describe the 
prerequisites for claiming a compensable mental injury. Section 440.093 
states that “a mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement 
only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment” and “[a] 
physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied 
by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be compensable 
under this chapter.”68 Additionally, the mental or nervous injury must be 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Harper Gerlach PL, Florida Lawmakers Broaden Workers’ Comp. Coverage for ‘First 
Responders,’ 19 NO. 8 FLA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2007).  
 64. Id. (“[T]he first responder may receive medical benefits (but not indemnity 
benefits) . . . [and] may receive indemnity benefits [only] if a compensable physical injury 
accompanies the mental or nervous injury.”); see § 112.1815(3) (excluding indemnification unless 
a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies the mental or nervous 
injury). It is unclear why the legislature chose to explicitly deny indemnity. The distinction seems 
arbitrarily drawn as providing first responders with medical benefits for proven, legitimate mental 
injury claims validates such injuries and shows they should be given credence. If medical benefits 
are provided, the employee has already demonstrated the manifestation of an injury by clear and 
convincing evidence, the standard used to verify compensable injuries. Id.  
 65. S. 516, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017); H.R. 1019; 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 
2017); S. 1088, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 66. S. 516, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017); H.R. 1019; 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 
2017); S. 1088, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 67. The ADA is codified in the United States Code, beginning at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012); 
Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724, 726–27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). See infra Section II.D for 
ADA preemption discussion. 
 68. § 440.093(1). 
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demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence and “[t]he compensable 
physical injury must be and remain the major contributing cause of the 
mental or nervous condition.”69  
In 2007, Governor Charlie Crist signed a bill that broadened the 
compensation coverage available to first responders,70 now codified in 
Florida Statutes section 112.1815. The statute defines “first responder” 
as “a law enforcement officer, . . . a firefighter, . . . an emergency medical 
technician [EMT] or paramedic . . . employed by state or local 
government” and does allow for some compensation, such as medical 
benefits, for strictly mental injury.71 However, the statute explicitly states 
that “[f]or a mental or nervous injury arising out of the employment 
unaccompanied by a physical injury . . . only medical benefits . . . shall 
be payable,” and that “payment of indemnity . . . may not be made unless 
a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies 
the mental or nervous injury.”72 Indemnity benefits help compensate an 
employee for his loss of income and earning capacity,73 and in some 
circumstances are crucial to an employee who is unable to return to work 
for a prolonged or undetermined period of time. Without such benefits, 
the employee may find himself with no viable source of income,74 and 
like Officer Realin, may face uncertainty as to how he will continue to 
support his family financially.  
B.  Illustrative Case Law: McKenzie v. Mental Health Care 
The Florida First District Court of Appeal discussed Section 440.093 
at length in McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc.75 In McKenzie, a 
registered nurse working in a treatment center that housed patients with 
behavioral and mental disorders was struck in the throat by a violent 
patient, resulting in physical injury.76 In addition, the nurse claimed she 
sustained psychological injury as a result of the attack, but her employer 
denied workers’ compensation for this claim.77 The McKenzie court 
stated that the purpose of workers’ compensation law is to provide 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. § 440.093(2). 
 70. Harper Gerlach PL, supra note 63, at 1. 
 71. § 112.1815. 
 72. Id. § 112.1815(2)(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
 73. Workers’ Compensation, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.thefree 
dictionary.com/Workers’+Compensation (last visited June 21, 2016). 
 74. Christopher J. Boggs, Benefits Provided Under Workers’ Compensation Laws, INS. J. 
(Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/03/23/ 
360655.htm (describing how injured employees may be completely unable to work and garner the 
same pay as they could prior to their injury, resulting in either a complete loss of income or a 
considerably diminished lifestyle). 
 75. 43 So. 3d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). 
 76. Id. at 768. 
 77. Id.  
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defined benefits for certain injuries caused by workplace accidents.78 The 
court continued to describe situations in which mental or nervous injuries 
might occur.79 Notably, the court recognized that the second sentence of 
section 440.093(1) recognizes and makes compensable “mental or 
nervous injuries that accompany a separate physical injury serious 
enough to require medical treatment.”80 The court believed it was 
particularly important to recognize that the workplace accident at issue in 
this case caused two separate injuries, one physical and one mental.81 
Another example of such contemporaneous injuries might be if an 
employee was sexually assaulted or battered at work, resulting in both a 
compensable physical injury and an accompanying mental injury. 
According to the court in McKenzie, in such a situation the employee 
“simultaneously suffered two compensable workplace injuries.”82 The 
court contrasted this scenario with circumstances giving rise to a purely 
psychological injury, such as an employee being robbed at gunpoint or 
witnessing a horrific event in the workplace.83 Although the legislature 
recognizes that such mental injuries can occur and do exist, they are 
nonetheless not compensable under the current statutory scheme.84 
C.  Types of Mental Injury 
As the court in McKenzie noted, there are several different types of 
mental injuries considered by the legislature. The court discussed four 
types of injury, two of which are compensable and two of which are not.85 
These different injury scenarios can further be broken down into the three 
sub-categories of (1) physical–mental injury, (2) mental–physical injury, 
and (3) mental–mental injury.86  
                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. at 769. 
 79. Id. at 769–70. 
 80. Id. at 769. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. The court in McKenzie appeared to be comfortable with recognizing and 
compensating the accompanying mental injury because the injury met the requirements of 
sections 440.09 and 440.093 of the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (2017) (requiring that 
the injury arise out of work performed in the course and scope of employment; that the injury be 
“established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical 
findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any 
resulting injuries”); id. § 440.093(2) (requiring that claimants demonstrate injury by clear and 
convincing evidence “by a licensed psychiatrist meeting criteria established in the most recent 
edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American 
Psychiatric Association”; and that the injury “remain[s] the major contributing cause of the mental 
or nervous condition and the compensable physical injury . . . be at least 50 percent responsible 
for the mental or nervous condition”). 
 83. McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 769. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 769–70. 
 86. Burke, supra note 51, at 896. 
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A physical–mental injury occurs when an employee suffers a physical 
injury that causes some psychological response in the employee, resulting 
in an accompanying mental injury subsequent to or concurrent with the 
physical injury.87 Examples of this might include an employee who 
suffers a painful burn or loss of limb on the job, and over time the 
employee becomes clinically depressed, develops PTSD, severe anxiety, 
or some other adverse mental response resulting from the earlier physical 
injury.88 Pursuant to subsection 440.093(2) and the second sentence of 
subsection 440.093(1), the psychological injury that manifests is 
compensable as long as the underlying physical injury is proven to be the 
“major contributing cause” of the mental injury, or the psychological 
injury is deemed to have occurred simultaneously with the physical 
injury.89 These types of claims are generally compensable because the 
employee has suffered a “distinct, objective physical and traumatic injury 
during the course of his employment.”90 
Mental–physical classification, on the other hand, encompasses 
physical injuries that result from mental or nervous injury that are 
unaccompanied by a clear causative physical trauma.91 As the third 
sentence of subsection 440.093(1) dictates, employees injured under this 
scenario do not receive compensation.92 An example of this situation 
might be where an employee suffers a heart attack or develops high blood 
pressure due to constant and prolonged workplace pressures. Because the 
physical injury claimed manifested as a result of mental injury, it is not 
compensable under Florida law. Despite the objective nature of the 
resulting physical injury, courts and legislators are concerned about the 
difficulty of proving that the injury was actually caused by the workplace 
stimuli.93 
Lastly, mental–mental injury claims, like the injury claimed by 
Officer Realin, do not have an underlying causative physical 
component.94 This type of injury is addressed by the first sentence of 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id.  
 88. Burke offers the example of an oil rig worker who is badly burned in a rig fire. The 
worker’s physical injuries ultimately heal, but the worker develops a paralyzing fear that another 
fire will inevitably occur, further disabling his ability to perform his job. Id. 
 89. FLA. STAT. § 440.093(1)–(2) (2017); McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 770. 
 90. Burke, supra note 51, at 896. 
 91. Id.; McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 769–70. 
 92. Id.; § 440.093(1). 
 93. Burke, supra note 51, at 896. Despite the objective, physical response, legislators fear 
the burden that accompanies proving what caused injuries of this kind. Using the heart attack 
example, a loud, abrupt noise might induce extreme fright and cause someone to suffer a heart 
attack; however, certain individuals are more susceptible to suffering heart attacks than others. Id. 
at 896–97. In such a circumstance, it cannot clearly be concluded that the major contributing cause 
of the heart attack was the noise, and not the predisposition to heart attacks. Id. 
 94. Id. at 897. PTSD and other mental–mental injuries oftentimes manifest themselves in 
physical symptoms such as hypertension and other cardiac issues such as coronary heart disease. 
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section 440.093(1), which states that mental or nervous injuries “due to 
stress, fright, or excitement only,” are not considered a compensable 
injury deemed to have arisen out of the course of employment.95 Like the 
robbery example provided by the court in McKenzie,96 Officer Realin 
sustained no subsequent or contemporaneous physical injury while 
removing the bodies from the nightclub.97 As such, his mental injury is 
not recognized as a compensable injury by Florida statutes. Legislatures 
justify their denial of compensation citing concerns about establishing 
causation, proof of injury, and degree of impairment.98 
McKenzie is helpful in understanding how Florida courts and 
legislators view what injuries are compensable and how they distinguish 
between types of mental injury. In Officer Realin’s case, because he 
suffered no physical injury while removing the bodies, he would have 
fallen under the purview of subsection 440.093(1), and absent the 
additional first responder statute he would not be entitled to any 
compensation benefits at all. This distinction between what benefits are 
awarded based on what type of mental injury is sustained is important, 
because despite the fact that Officer Realin is now entitled to ongoing 
medical compensation per the first responder statute, section 112.1815 
still distinguishes between physical–mental and mental–mental injuries. 
First responders claiming purely mental injury enjoy only limited rights, 
while claimants who suffered an underlying physical injury are green-
lighted to receive full compensation, including rights to indemnification. 
If Officer Realin had tripped and broken his leg while removing the 
bodies, he would have a stronger claim to full compensation. 
D.  Non-ADA Preemption 
The First District has found no direct conflict between the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA)99 and Florida’s workers’ compensation 
                                                                                                                     
Steven S. Coughlin, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Cardiovascular Disease, 5 OPEN 
CARDIOVASCULAR MED. J. 164, 164 (2011). However, because such injuries lack an underlying 
physical injury that gave rise to the mental injury itself, it remains uncompensated by the Florida 
legislature. § 440.093(1). 
 95. § 440.093(1). 
 96. McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 769 (“[A]n employee experiences mental trauma after being 
robbed at gunpoint but does not suffer a physical injury requiring medical treatment.”). 
 97. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 98. Burke, supra note 51, at 897. It is thought that these evidentiary hurdles are 
compounded by the lack of unanimity between medicine and psychiatry, including differing 
methods of evaluation for mental–mental injuries. Id. But see id. (“[P]sychiatric injuries are better 
understood than ever before, an understanding that should be extended to the workers’ 
compensation framework within a changing workplace.”). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
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statutes that classify purely mental injuries as non-compensable.100 In 
coming to this conclusion, the court in Hensley v. Punta Gorda101 
reasoned that the Florida workers’ compensation statutes were crafted to 
“assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits 
to an injured worker and to facilitate the workers’ return to gainful 
reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.”102 Conversely, the 
ADA is intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” 
and “to prevent the prejudicial treatment of disabled persons and to allow 
such persons to compete in the workplace.”103 The two bodies of law 
were therefore created with different intents and to satisfy two distinct 
goals. While Florida workers’ compensation statutes address the needs of 
disabled individuals incapable of returning to their former employment, 
the ADA does not aim to guarantee equal rights to benefits for all disabled 
individuals.104 Workers’ compensation statutes denying compensation to 
individuals who suffered purely mental injuries are not preempted 
because the ADA does not mandate that all disabled persons must receive 
equal benefits, “regardless of their varying abilities to work.”105 As long 
as there are no unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to a disabled 
person’s right to work, under the ADA an employer is under no legal duty 
to provide equal benefits for employees who have suffered different 
forms of mental injury.106 The ADA therefore cannot be utilized to 
remedy the injustices created by the current Florida workers’ 
compensation statutory scheme. Instead, constitutional challenges to the 
statutes from due process and access to the courts standpoints must be the 
vehicles used to effectuate change. 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“Although 
entitlement to Florida workers’ compensation benefits is subject to the anti-discrimination 
provisions of the ADA, it does not follow that the ADA necessarily preempts Florida workers’ 
compensation laws.”). 
 101. Id. at 724. 
 102. Id. at 727 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (Supp. 1994)). 
 103. Id.; see also Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1121–22 (2010) (describing the general accommodation requirements of 
employers under the ADA and characterizing the ADA as the “emancipation proclamation for 
people with disabilities”). 
 104. Hensley, 686 So. 2d at 727. The ADA prohibits employers from “‘discriminat[ing] 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard 
to’ hiring, discharge, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Kelly Cahill Timmons, 
Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 190 
(2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)). The ADA only protects “qualified” individuals 
from discrimination by employers. Id. at 190–91 (defining “qualified individual” as someone who 
“with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires”). 
 105. Hensley, 686 So. 2d at 727. 
 106. Id. at 728. 
17
Foels: Rescuing the Rescuer: Reforming How Florida’s Workers’ Compensati
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1456 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
Both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions guarantee all natural persons 
certain inalienable basic rights, among which are the rights to enjoy and 
defend life and liberty, pursue happiness, and to acquire, possess, and 
protect property.107 According to the Florida Constitution, if a citizen is 
deprived of life, liberty, or property for a sufficient reason, they are 
guaranteed due process of law, and shall have full access to the courts for 
redress of any injury.108 Keeping in mind the quid pro quo created by the 
workers’ compensation system, it is helpful to analyze how the Florida 
Supreme Court has balanced these constitutional rights with the 
reciprocity agreement between employer and employee.109 This Part will 
analyze the constitutionality of Florida’s first responder workers’ 
compensation statute, both from due process and access to the courts 
standpoints. Ultimately, this Part argues that an indefinite, categorical 
denial of full coverage for all first responders who suffer mental–mental 
injury violates both U.S. and Florida constitutional guarantees.  
A.  Due Process: The Castellanos v. Next Door Co. Standard 
To successfully bring a due process challenge, it must first be 
established that the claimant has a legitimate property interest the 
claimant desires to protect.110 In Rucker v. City of Ocala,111 the Florida 
Supreme Court found that an injured employee’s right to receive workers’ 
compensation benefits qualifies as such an interest.112 Florida courts have 
never considered a due process challenge to first responder indemnity 
benefits for PTSD. However, the Florida Supreme Court recently 
addressed a due process challenge to a different section of the current 
                                                                                                                     
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.  
 108. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21. While not stated expressly, as in the Florida Constitution, 
the right of access to courts is also implicit in the U.S. Constitution. See Judith Anne Bass, Article 
I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 871, 871 (1977) (“The right of 
access to the courts was such an integral part of the common law that the framers of our Federal 
Constitution perceived no need to guarantee this right expressly. Though not specifically provided 
for, the right of court access is nevertheless pervasive within the United States Constitution.”). 
Over the years, courts have found a federal constitutional guarantee of access to courts in: the 
First Amendment’s petition for redress of grievances clause, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ due process clauses, the Sixth Amendment’s right to speedy and public trial 
guarantee, the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Id. at 871–72. 
 109. See supra Section I.B. 
 110. Rucker v. City of Ocala, 684 So. 2d 836, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Procedural due 
process rights derive from a property interest in which the individual has a legitimate claim.”). 
 111. Id. at 836. 
 112. Id. at 840; see also De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 n.6 
(Fla. 1989) (“[I]n the sense that the worker’s compensation system replaced other rights formerly 
afforded to workers, we cannot agree . . . that worker’s compensation is entirely in the nature of 
a privilege.”). 
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workers’ compensation code. In Castellanos v. Next Door Co.,113 the 
Florida Supreme Court was asked to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
mandatory fee schedule dictated by Florida Statutes section 440.34.114 
The statute created an irrebuttable presumption that precluded any 
consideration or questioning of whether a fee award was reasonable to 
compensate a workers’ compensation attorney.115 Despite the obvious 
unreasonableness of the statutorily determined rate to be paid to 
Castellanos’s attorney,116 the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) and 
the First District were barred from reviewing the fee award for 
reasonableness.117 The fee schedule statute simply “presumes that the 
ultimate fee will always be reasonable . . . without providing any 
mechanism for refutation.”118 The Florida Supreme Court found that such 
preclusion of any inquiry into reasonableness was unconstitutional under 
both the Florida and U.S. Constitutions as a violation of due process.119  
As part of their analysis, the court set forth a three-part test used to 
determine the constitutionality of a statute’s conclusive presumption.120 
The court must inquire into 
(1) whether the concern of the Legislature was ‘reasonably 
aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately 
desired to avoid’; (2) whether there was a ‘reasonable basis 
for a conclusion that the statute would protect against its 
occurrence’; and (3) whether ‘the expense and other 
difficulties of individual determinations justify the inherent 
imprecision of a conclusive presumption.’121  
For an irrebuttable presumption to pass a constitutional due process 
challenge, each prong of the test must be satisfied.122  
  
                                                                                                                     
 113. 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016). 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (2016); Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 432. 
 115. Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 432. 
 116. Because section 440.34 uses a sliding scale to limit a claimant’s ability to recover fees 
based on the amount of benefits obtained, regardless of the amount of time and energy actually 
expended, the fee awarded to Castellanos’s attorney amounted to $1.53 per hour for 107.2 hours 
of work. Id. at 433. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 432, 435 (holding that the statute violated both article I, section 9 of the Florida 
Constitution and Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution). 
 120. Id. at 444. 
 121. Id. (quoting Recchi Am., Inc. v. Hall, 692 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 1997)). 
 122. Id. (noting that the challenged presumption in Recchi failed because the expense and 
other difficulties of individual determinations failed to justify the imprecision of the presumption, 
thus failing the test by not satisfying prong (3)). 
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It is instructive to focus on the court’s analysis of the first and third 
prongs.123 Applying those prongs to the situation of first responders 
provides a compelling argument that the first responder statute’s 
irrebuttable presumption against indemnification for mental–mental 
injury should be found unconstitutional. In Castellanos, the court 
concluded that the fee schedule statute failed the first prong of the test, 
reasoning that while the fee schedule’s conclusive presumption achieves 
the legislative goal of avoiding excessive attorney’s fees by mandating 
fee standardization, “it does so in a manner that lacks any relationship to 
the amount of time and effort actually expended by the attorney.”124 
Additionally, the court found that a concern about excessive fee awards 
is insufficient, as other safeguards are already in place to guard against 
the risk of excessive fees.125 The court concluded that the statute would 
also fail the third prong of the test because judges of compensation claims 
are skilled in determining, awarding, and approving fees without undue 
expense or difficulty, and have done so since the advent of the workers’ 
compensation system.126 Despite the proven efficiency of the courts, the 
fee schedule prevents injured workers from presenting evidence to prove 
unreasonable inadequacy of a fee in their specific case.127 The court found 
that without the ability of the judiciary to assess reasonableness on a case-
by-case basis and deviate from the statutory mandate when necessary, 
there remains the risk that the result will be “arbitrary, unjust, and grossly 
inadequate.”128 
B.  Access to Courts: The Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg Standard 
Another recent Florida Supreme Court case, Westphal v. City of St. 
Petersburg,129 considered the constitutionality of a workers’ 
compensation statute that cut off disability benefits after a predetermined 
                                                                                                                     
 123. The second prong—“whether there was a ‘reasonable basis for a conclusion that the 
statute would protect against’” abuse the legislature desired to avoid—has little applicability here. 
Id. Clearly an absolute bar of indemnification claims for first responder mental–mental injury 
could reasonably be concluded to protect against evidentiary and floodgate concerns. The focus 
of this analysis is on the reasonableness of those legislative concerns themselves, not on the 
reasonableness of the means to protect against them. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citing a rule regulating the Florida Bar, 4–1.5, as an example, which provides a 
number of factors to consider when determining a reasonable fee). 
 126. Id. at 446. A similar rationale was used in deciding Recchi, where the court held that a 
statute withholding from an employee the opportunity to rebut the presumption that intoxication 
or influence of drugs was a contributing cause of his or her workplace injury was held to violate 
due process. 692 So. 2d at 154. The presumption ultimately failed the third prong of the test 
because the relatively low expense and minor difficulties of individual determinations did not 
justify the inherent imprecision of the conclusive presumption. Id.  
 127. Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 448. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). 
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period of time for workers who are totally disabled and incapable of 
working, but who have not yet reached maximum medical 
improvement.130 The Court found that the statute was unconstitutional 
under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution, the guarantee of 
the right of access to courts.131 In so finding, the court reasoned that the 
statute “deprive[d] an injured worker of disability benefits . . . for an 
indefinite amount of time . . . creating a system of redress that no longer 
function[ed] as a reasonable alternative to tort litigation.”132 
The court articulated that the statute frustrated the stated purpose of 
workers’ compensation law133 because it cut off the benefits provided to 
an injured worker at a critical time—when the employee cannot return to 
work but the employee’s doctors believe that the employee’s condition 
may still continue to improve.134 The “constitutional yardstick” applied 
by the court to determine whether an access-to-the-courts violation has 
occurred, was “whether the [statutory] scheme continues to provide 
‘adequate, sufficient, and . . . preferable safeguards for an employee who 
is injured on the job.’”135 Additionally, the court harped on the 
importance of the right of access to courts, noting that the right has 
typically been construed liberally to guarantee accessibility to courts for 
injured employees to resolve disputes.136 The court continued that: 
[T]he Legislature is without power to abolish such a right 
without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the 
rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless 
the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity 
for the abolishment of such a right, and no alternative 
method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.137 
Although workers’ compensation abolished the right to sue an employer 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 313 (referencing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2)(a) (2016)). 
 131. Id. at 327. 
 132. Id. at 313. 
 133. § 440.015 (articulating that the purpose of workers’ compensation law is “to assure the 
quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate 
the worker’s return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer”); Westphal, 
194 So. 3d at 314 (“[T]he workers’ compensation law undoubtedly fails to provide ‘full medical 
care and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability regardless of fault.’”). For further 
general discussion of the historical driving force behind workers’ compensation law, see supra 
Section I.B. 
 134. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 314. 
 135. Id. at 315 (quoting Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)). 
 136. Id. at 321 (citing the language of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution that 
guarantees every person access to the courts and ensures the administration of justice without 
denial or delay); Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992) (stating that “[t]he 
right to go to court to resolve our disputes” is a fundamental right), receded from on other grounds, 
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996).  
 137. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322 (quoting Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4) (emphasis added). 
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in tort for job-related injuries, it “provide[s] adequate, sufficient, and 
even preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job, 
thus satisfying one of the exceptions to the rule against abolition of the 
right to redress for an injury.”138  
Workers’ compensation constitutes a “reasonable alternative” to suing 
in tort, and does not violate the constitutional guarantee of access to 
courts, only “so long as it provides adequate and sufficient safeguards for 
the injured employee.”139 For a workers’ compensation law to be upheld 
as constitutional, it must continue to provide a reasonable alternative to 
tort litigation, keeping in mind the original intent of the workers’ 
compensation scheme.140 The proverbial “tipping point” where a statute 
crosses the line into unconstitutionality is when it effectively constitutes 
a denial of benefits for a legitimately injured employee.141 While in 
Westphal the court considered the constitutional challenge of a statute 
that completely denied benefits to a disabled worker,142 the first 
responder statute’s denial of indemnity is no less serious, as it denies 
hardworking first responders the critical economic support necessary to 
pay their bills and survive on a day-to-day basis. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 138. Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted). When the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act (FWCA) 
was first enacted, the statutory scheme was thought to be a favorable substitute for tort litigation, 
as it diminished the uncertainty that inevitably accompanies tort litigation, benefitting both 
employer and employee. Viktoryia Johnson, Florida Workers’ Compensation Act: The 
Unconstitutional Erosion of the Quid Pro Quo, 45 STETSON L. REV. 119, 143 (2015) (“Florida’s 
[workers’] compensation program was established . . . to replace an unwieldy tort system that 
made it virtually impossible for businesses to predict or insure for the cost of industrial 
accidents.”). But see id. at 119, 144 (suggesting that, while the original workers’ compensation 
scheme enacted by the Florida legislature in 1935 may have served as an adequate substitute for 
tort, over time the statute’s modality has been significantly eroded and in its present state it is no 
longer sufficient to substitute for the access to courts guarantee). 
 139. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. 
 140. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322–23 (“[T]o provide ‘injured workers with full medical care 
and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability regardless or fault and without the delay and 
uncertainty of tort litigation.’”). 
 141. Id. at 323 (describing this “tipping point” as the point where the diminution of benefits 
effectively constitutes a denial of benefits). 
 142. The court contrasted the situation in Westphal with Martinez v. Scanlan, an earlier 
decision in which a statute that reduced the workers’ compensation benefits a claimant would 
receive was upheld as constitutional. Compare 194 So. 3d at 322–23, with 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 
1991). While the current first responder situation does not deal with a full denial of benefits, 
Martinez can be contrasted, as the court held that such a reduction in benefits still constitutes a 
reasonable alternative to tort litigation because it continues to provide injured workers with full 
medical care and wage-loss payments. Compare 194 So. 3d at 322–23, with 582 So. 2d at 1171–
72. 
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C.  Dispelling Legislative Concerns 
From both Castellanos and Westphal a workable standard can be 
deduced and applied to the current first responder circumstance.143 The 
constitutional standards used in both cases exhibit a common and 
controlling denominator: whether a reasonable legislative concern 
overcomes the public necessity for a statutory irrebuttable 
presumption.144 To clearly and appropriately apply these standards to the 
first responder circumstance, one must first address and abate the 
legislative concerns that weigh in favor of the current conclusive 
presumption against fully compensating mental–mental injuries of first 
responders. Doing so will show that the concerns are largely overblown, 
and prove that such a presumption frustrates the purpose of workers’ 
compensation law by unreasonably and unconstitutionally denying full 
compensation for first responders. 
When state legislatures consider what injuries should be compensable 
under workers’ compensation statutes, two concerns dominate the 
conversation. First, legislators are concerned about malingering,145 and 
that allowing mental–mental claims will lead to other evidentiary 
difficulties in proving that the mental injuries were actually caused by 
workplace stimuli.146 Second, legislators are concerned that allowing 
mental–mental claims will cause an expensive increase in the amount of 
workers’ compensation claims; an opening of the proverbial “floodgates” 
that will have a negative fiscal impact on employers, administrative 
agencies, and society as a whole.147 
  
                                                                                                                     
 143. See infra Section III.D for the application of the Castellanos and Westphal standards to 
the first responder circumstance.  
 144. In Castellanos, this concern is exemplified in the first prong of the court’s test: whether 
the concern of the Legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse it legitimately 
desired to avoid. 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (2016). In Westphal, that concern is reflected in the court’s 
articulation that, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the 
abolishment of an individual’s rights, the legislature is without power to abolish those rights. 194 
So. 3d at 322. 
 145. Malinger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malinger 
(last visited June 21, 2017) (defining malingering as “pretend[ing] or exaggerate[ing] incapacity 
or illness (as to avoid duty or work)”). 
 146. Tucker, supra note 19, at 477. 
 147. Id. at 481; see also PROFESSIONAL STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, 
FLA. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & INS. 2, 10–13 (2007) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL STAFF 
ANALYSIS], http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/ 2007s0746.bi.pdf 
(discussing generally the fiscal implications of SB 746, including the additional costs expected 
for individual self-insurers, after section 112.1815, Florida Statutes, goes into effect). 
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1.  Evidentiary Concerns 
Because mental injuries and disorders such as PTSD develop through  
“‘complex interrelation’ between one’s ‘internal, subjective reality’ and 
[one’s] ‘external, environmental reality,’” those in favor of barring their 
compensability argue that the evidentiary burden of proving or 
disproving purely mental claims will be too immense.148 Due to this 
complexity, legislators fear that these types of injuries will be more 
difficult to evaluate and may therefore be easier to falsify.149 Fear of 
fraudulently brought claims, or malingering,150 has greatly influenced 
legislators’ and judiciaries’ attitudes regarding whether or not these 
claims can and should be compensable.151  
Fears of malingering and causation uncertainty, while once potentially 
legitimate concerns, have largely been quelled by scientific 
breakthroughs and increased understanding of mental health disorders.152 
In fact, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV) provides a list of factors to use to detect malingering,153 
available to any clinician or expert. There is even an entire subfield of 
forensic psychology that centers around the detection of malingering.154 
Additionally, PTSD has been empirically tested and subjected to critique 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Tucker, supra note 19, at 477. 
 149. Bailey, supra note 29, at 514; see also Tucker, supra note 19, at 477 (addressing the 
concerns about determining the true cause of a mental disorder, such as the challenges of 
determining which external, environmental factors is the primary cause of the disorder). 
 150. Malingering is defined as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated 
physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as . . . avoiding work 
[or] obtaining financial compensation.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 683 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-IV], 
https://justines2010blog.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/dsm-iv.pdf. The newest edition, DSM-V, 
does not specifically discuss malingering or criteria for evaluating malingering. 
 151. Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers’ Compensation Mental Disability 
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 273 (1983) (“The spectre 
of fraud has influenced judicial attitudes toward mental injuries.”). But see Lisa Cullen, The Myth 
of Workers’ Compensation Fraud, FRONTLINE PBS (2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/workplace/etc/fraud.html (asserting that the insurance industry’s focus on 
malingering may be unfounded, as studies show that only 1–2% of all workers’ compensation 
claims are fraudulent).  
 152. 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04 (Matthew Bender ed.):  
 
[I]t is no longer realistic to draw a line between what is ‘nervous’ and what is 
‘physical’ . . . [p]erhaps, in earlier years, when much less was known about 
mental and nervous injuries and their relation to ‘physical’ symptoms and 
behavior, there was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for 
ruling out recoveries based on such injuries . . . in workmen’s compensation. 
But the excuse no longer exists. 
 
 153. DSM-IV, supra note 150, at 683. 
 154. Tucker, supra note 19, at 479. 
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for decades, studies of PTSD patients have been both published and peer 
reviewed, and “PTSD has been accepted as textbook science by the 
scientific community for [over] twenty years.”155 PTSD testimony meets 
all of the Daubert criteria.156 
While allowing mental–mental injuries into the realm of workers’ 
compensation claims would not circumvent a battle of the experts,157 this 
is not a battle unique to mental–mental injury claims. One of the 
hallmarks of the current workers’ compensation system is a highly 
specialized trier of fact that considers expert testimony with an eye 
toward the concern that the claimant may be malingering, exaggerating 
his or her injuries, or attempting to claim an injury unrelated to 
employment.158 Experts are routinely admitted to testify regarding the 
legitimacy and causative nature of a claimant’s physical injuries or 
mental injuries caused by physical trauma.159 Courts already depend on 
triers of fact to detect and weed out fraudulent or illegitimate claims.160 
It follows, then, that fact finders should similarly be able to consider 
evidence presented “to determine whether a mental or emotional injury 
has arisen from and in the course of employment, just as they do for 
physical injuries.”161 It would produce a far more reasonable and 
equitable result to allow the trier of fact to consider evidence that a 
claimant is malingering, rather than to assume that all mental–mental 
claimants are malingering. 
Finally, allowing expert testimony to be considered to prove or 
disprove a PTSD claim would also produce a perception in the eyes of 
the claimant that the results are fair. Though experts will still be necessary 
to determine claim validity, “resources expended by the parties would be 
more appropriately channeled into considering the merits of the case, as 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 30. 
 156. Id. The Daubert standard requires a judge to “examine the proffered testimony for 
falsifiability, error rate and the existence of protocols, peer review and publication, and general 
acceptance.” Id. at 29. 
 157. Deirdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (2011) (“Evidence of PTSD is generally offered through expert 
witnesses . . . [such as] treating clinicians who describe their diagnostic impressions of their 
patients or forensic examiners retained by one of the parties to evaluate an individual and render 
an opinion on a specific issue tied to the civil or criminal litigation.”). 
 158. Tucker, supra note 19, at 479–80. 
 159. Smith, supra note 157, at 45 (discussing the use of experts and the role of the courts as 
fact finders); Tucker, supra note 19, at 480.  
 160. Tucker, supra note 19, at 480. 
 161. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 157, at 51 (“In short, with few exceptions, courts 
generally do not use rules of evidence as a basis to restrict PTSD-based expert testimony. Rather, 
reasoning that due to its inclusion in [the] DSM[,] PTSD is a ‘medically recognized disorder,’ 
[and] courts regard it as relevant, useful, and appropriate for fact finders to . . . rely upon the 
adversarial process to flesh out the limitations of such evidence.”). 
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opposed to peripheral issues.”162 No matter the result, claimants will feel 
that they did all they could, and their money spent fighting for their claim 
was at least channeled toward the appropriate issues. Even if the claimant 
is unsuccessful, at minimum she would have the dignity of having her 
claim heard on its merits, rather than automatically dispelled without 
consideration.163  
2.  The Proverbial Floodgate Concern 
Courts have voiced the concern that “recognizing ‘compensation for 
any mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-job stressful events 
or conditions would . . . open a floodgate for workers who succumb to 
the everyday pressures of life.’”164 In 2007, when the Florida Senate 
considered the original first responder amendment,165 the Banking and 
Insurance Senate Committee prepared an economic impact statement 
discussing the potential fiscal ramifications of the bill.166 Unsurprisingly, 
it was estimated that allowing first responders to recover medical benefits 
for purely mental injury would increase the overall cost of compensating 
the first responder class.167 It also follows that loosening compensability 
standards will likely add claims,168 though the report indicated that 
broadening the benefits available to first responders would only 
marginally increase the amount of first responder claims.169 While the 
decision to refrain from expanding coverage to full indemnification is not 
discussed, the committee’s apparent controlling concern was what 
economic impact loosening coverage might have on local government 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Bailey, supra note 29, at 527. 
 163. Id. at 528. Research has shown that “litigants are more likely to be satisfied with the 
outcome [of a claim] when they perceive the decision-making process is fair.” Id. at 527–28. 
 164. Tucker, supra note 19, at 478; see also 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04(2) (stating 
that in some jurisdictions, due to concerns about flooding claims over workplace stress, states 
have placed limitations on such claims even in the absence of legislation).  
 165. Referenced in Section II.A. 
 166. PROFESSIONAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 147, at 2. 
 167. Id. at 2 (“The National Council on Compensation Insurers (NCCI) estimates that costs 
for first responder classes would increase 5.9 – 6.4 percent ($12.2 – 13.0 million) if this proposal 
were enacted in its current form.”). Because individual self-insurers do not report data to the 
NCCI, they were not included in that estimate; however, additional costs for individual self-
insurers that employ first responders, such as state and local governmental agencies, are expected 
as well. Id. 
 168. Id. at 11 (“Depending on judicial interpretation, compensability of any mental injury 
‘occurring as a manifestation of an employment’ may not only allow compensation of first 
responders traumatized by the suffering they’ve seen in the course of their employment, but may 
also allow compensation as a result of the stress from routine activities, interactions and 
employment decisions.”). 
 169. Id. (estimating that the combined impact of the provisions of the new statute would 
increase the number of compensable claims for first responders by 1%). 
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and the tax payers that would ultimately have to foot the bill for the 
increase in claims.170  
Several bills proposed in the 2017 legislative session aimed to expand 
the coverage available to first responders who sustain purely mental 
injury.171 However, the bills were proposed too late, and were unable to 
make it through the committee review process before the end of the 
legislative session.172 The bill that progressed the furthest, SB 1088, was 
specifically targeted at authorizing indemnity payments for first 
responders who sustained mental or nervous injury, and loosening 
evidentiary standards for such claims.173 The Banking and Insurance 
Senate Committee likewise prepared a report for this bill, ultimately 
approving the bill by unanimous vote.174 The report stated that, according 
to the National Council on Compensation Insurance, “the impact on 
overall workers’ compensation costs would be expected to be small, since 
the data reported . . . show that first responders represent approximately 
2.5 percent of statewide losses in Florida.”175 However, the Committee 
ultimately concluded that it could not predict with certainty the fiscal 
impact the bill will have on the private or government sectors, though it 
noted that a small increase in both claims and cost is expected.176 
It flows logically that loosening compensability standards for first 
responders will likely increase the amount of first responder claims. As 
more injuries are brought into the compensability spectrum, injured 
employees such as Officer Realin will file a claim and (hopefully) receive 
compensation. The costs of providing full indemnification for first 
responders may not be as great as many people fear, however. First 
                                                                                                                     
 170. Id. at 10–13 (discussing the fiscal impact of the bill on private sector and governmental 
sector entities). 
 171. S. 516, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017); H.R. 1019; 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 
2017); S. 1088, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 172. See Julie Gargotta, Bill Expanding Workers’ Compensation for First Responders in 
Jeopardy, NEWS 13 (Apr. 3, 2017, 6:14 PM), http://www.mynews13.com/content/news/ 
cfnews13/news/article.html/content/news/articles/cfn/2017/4/3/bill_expanding_worke.html.  
 173. BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, FLA. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & 
INS. 1, 1 (Apr. 17, 2017) [hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS], https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/ 
Bill/2017/1088/Analyses/2017s01088.bi.PDF.  
 174. Mike Holfeld, PTSD Legislation Unanimously Passes Florida Subcommittee, 
CLICKORLANDO (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:37 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/ptsd-legislation-
unanimously-passes-florida-sub-committee. 
 175. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 9. 
 176. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 9–10. Regarding the private sector impact, the 
Committee estimated that the impact on overall system costs is expected to be small—less than 
1%. Id. at 9. In the government sector context, there is likewise a potential for a small increase in 
cost, though if a state employee is unable to return to work due to particularly severe injury, his 
claim may result in a higher cost depending on his age and salary. Id. at 10. 
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responders represent only a small portion of the general populace,177 so 
compensating them with indemnification benefits will not deal a 
crippling blow to a provider’s fiscal budget. Additionally, it may be more 
costly for governments to not fully compensate first responders, as the 
injured will be slower to return to work or work performance may suffer 
as a result of returning to work before the employee is ready.178 Such 
hindered work performance may also result in unintended mistakes and 
negligence, exposing governmental agencies to increased liability in 
tort.179 If first responders with mental injury such as PTSD are not given 
sufficient time or support to enable them to recover, they may not be able 
to earn income through employment and could end up on welfare or other 
governmental support anyway.180 Governmental employers may be better 
off simply paying higher insurance premiums for increased coverage 
instead of dealing with the effects of undercompensation. 
While it is true that indemnification for legitimate first responder 
mental injury claims will undoubtedly impose at least some additional 
cost to local governments, the question of whether such coverage should 
be provided comes down to a cost–benefit analysis. Such an analysis 
“inevitably incorporate[s] political and moral judgments about the proper 
distribution of resources.”181 A society must both recalibrate its moral 
compass and view the situation with economic pragmatism; it must ask 
whether the cost of its first responders going undercompensated for 
legitimate mental injury outweighs the small economic benefit of 
withholding full compensation. While evidentiary and floodgate 
concerns may arguably outweigh the need to compensate every Average 
Joe for a stress-related mental injury suffered on the job, such concerns 
do not carry the same weight when applied to first responders. In light of 
this, applying the Castellanos and Westphal standards to first responders 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See KRISTINA SCHAFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS 
AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG FIRST RESPONDERS i (2015), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/ 
analytics-reports/CharacteristicsOfIndividualsAndEmploymentAmongFirstResponders.pdf 
(estimating nearly 1.2 million people work as police, firefighters, and emergency medical 
technicians (“EMTs”)). The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that approximately 324 million people 
live in the United States today. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited June 21, 2017). 
 178. Tucker, supra note 19, at 480 (citing a British study published in the British Medical 
Journal that found “impaired efficiency at work associated with mental health problems” costs 
the United Kingdom approximately £15.1 billion, or $22.5 billion, a year). 
 179. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 243 (AM. LAW INST. 1933) (“A 
master is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligent conduct of servants within 
the scope of employment.”). 
 180. See generally Chana Joffe-Walt, Unfit for Work: The Startling Rise of Disability in 
America, NPR (2013), http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work/ (stating that in the past three decades, 
the number of Americans who are on disability has skyrocketed, and that every month 14 million 
Americans collect a disability check from the government). 
 181. Tucker, supra note 19, at 481. 
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clearly shows that categorical denial of indemnification results not only 
in moral impropriety, but infringes upon constitutionally guaranteed 
rights as well.  
D.  Applying Castellanos and Westphal 
To make applying Castellanos and Westphal to the first responder 
circumstance easier to articulate and understand, a reiteration of the 
standards used by the Florida Supreme Court is helpful. Recall that, in 
Castellanos, the controlling questions were (1) whether the concern of 
the legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse the 
legislature legitimately desired to avoid; and (2) whether the expense and 
other difficulties of individual determinations justifies the inherent 
imprecision of a conclusive presumption.182 In Westphal, the court 
focused on (1) whether the legislature could show an overpowering 
public necessity for the abolishment of the right to pursue an action in 
tort; and (2) whether a viable alternative existed for meeting such a 
pressing public necessity could be shown.183 
The first prong of the Castellanos standard, whether a concern of the 
legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse the 
legislature legitimately desired to avoid, is not met in the first responder 
circumstance. The abuse to be avoided here is the possibility of fraudulent 
claims and malingering, and a decade or two ago such a concern might 
have justified limiting recovery for purely mental injury.184 However, due 
to advancements in diagnosis and treatment, and an increase in the 
amount of knowledge about PTSD and mental health generally, the fear 
of fraud is no longer a legitimate reason for limiting first responder 
recovery.185 In Castellanos, the court reasoned that a concern about 
excessive fee awards is insufficient to constitute a legitimate legislative 
concern, because safeguards are in place to defend against that risk.186 
Similarly, safeguards are routinely set forth in the area of workers’ 
compensation law to protect against fraud and malingering.187 Like any 
other compensable mental injury claim, claimants must come before an 
experienced, specialized fact finder; they must establish their injuries by 
clear and convincing medical evidence presented by a licensed 
psychiatrist; and they must meet all the criteria established in the most 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2016). 
 183. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311, 322 (Fla. 2016). 
 184. See Subsection III.C.1 for a discussion of evidentiary concerns, and why concerns of 
malingering and fraudulent claims are largely overblown. 
 185. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 186. Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 444. 
 187. For a discussion of how courts can protect against fraudulent claims, see Subsection 
III.C.1.a. 
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recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
before they can receive full compensation.188 
The fact is, PTSD incidence is significantly higher in law enforcement 
officers and other first responders than the rest of the general 
population.189 First responders are routinely exposed to stressful, 
traumatic events while performing their duties.190 The Banking and 
Insurance Senate Committee acknowledged this fact in their report on SB 
1088, and recognized that first responders are already part of a “special 
risk class” by virtue of the exceptionally demanding nature of their 
work.191 Furthermore, the report provided statistical evidence that, 
according to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the prevalence of 
PTSD in first responders is estimated to be as high as twenty to forty 
percent, while PTSD prevalence in the general population sits around 
seven to eight percent.192 There is therefore a much greater chance that a 
first responder claim of PTSD or other mental injury will be legitimate 
and stem from workplace stimuli, and a much greater chance that a 
blanket denial of indemnification would wrongfully deny coverage to 
first responders with legitimate mental injury. Similar to the court’s 
reasoning in Castellanos,193 the first prong fails here because although 
the conclusive presumption achieves the goal of standardization of 
coverage, it does so in a manner that lacks any relationship to the actual 
                                                                                                                     
 188. FLA. STAT. § 440.093(2) (2017). 
 189. Bailey, supra note 29, at 519; DSM-V, supra note 38, at 276 (“Rates of PTSD are higher 
among veterans and others whose vocation increases the risk of traumatic exposure (e.g., police, 
firefighters, emergency medical personnel).”); Kulbarsh, supra note 28 (“Law enforcement 
officers are also at a much higher rate of developing a cumulative form of PTSD related to their 
exposure to multiple traumatic events.”); Lainie Rutkow et al., Protecting the Mental Health of 
First Responders: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (“Studies have 
demonstrated that, after participating in disaster responses, first responders experience elevated 
rates of depression, stress disorders, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for months and 
sometimes years.”). 
 190. Rutkow et al., supra note 189, at 56 (“[First responders] often work long hours under 
stressful conditions, witnessing the human harms, physical destruction, and psychological 
devastation that can accompany disasters.”); DSM-V, supra note 38, at 271 (listing “first 
responders collecting human remains” and “police officers repeatedly being exposed to details of 
child abuse” as examples of repeated or extreme exposure to traumatic events). 
 191. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 5 (“[T]he Legislature recognized that certain 
employees must, as an essential function of their positions, perform work that is physically 
demanding or that requires extraordinary agility and mental acuity.”). A member of the Special 
Risk Class may retire at an earlier age and is eligible to receive higher disability and death benefits. 
Id. 
 192. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 9–10. 
 193. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2016) (stating that while the 
legislative intent to standardize attorney’s fees is accomplished by the conclusive presumption of 
section 440.34, Florida Statutes, the presumption does so in a manner that lacks any relationship 
to the amount of time or effort actually expended by the attorney, and is therefore 
unconstitutional). 
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merits of the claim.194 It is now understood how much greater at risk first 
responders are for developing PTSD, and it is possible to diagnose and 
treat such mental injuries and detect potential malingering. Because of 
these developments, the concern about abuse is no longer reasonable 
when applied to first responders, and it no longer outweighs the benefit 
of providing full compensation for proven, legitimate claims.  
The second prong of the Castellanos standard, whether the expense 
and other difficulties of individual determinations justify the inherent 
imprecision of a conclusive presumption, also fails when applied to first 
responders. The workers’ compensation system is a highly specialized, 
streamlined approach geared towards providing employees coverage in a 
quick and efficient manner.195 Workers’ compensation courts are skilled 
in determining whether an employee’s claimed injury is legitimate, and 
whether the injury sustained arose “out of work performed in the course 
and scope of employment.”196 Courts already evaluate testimony 
regarding legitimacy of mental injury claims, including testimony from 
expert psychiatrists and psychologists.197 It follows then, that courts 
should be able to evaluate testimony about the legitimacy or seriousness 
of first responders’ mental–mental injury with relatively little additional 
expense.  
Due to the ease with which Florida courts could incorporate purely 
mental injury into the spectrum of compensable injuries for first 
responders, it cannot be said that any perceived additional expense 
outweighs allowing indemnification, other than the cost of 
indemnification itself.198 Just as courts can assess reasonableness on a 
case-by-case basis with regard to attorney’s fees, so too can they assess 
the reasonableness and legitimacy of mental injury. Without the ability to 
consider the merits of each claim individually, there remains the risk that 
the result will be “arbitrary, unjust, and grossly inadequate.”199 By 
compensating first responders with medical benefits, the court is already 
acknowledging the legitimacy of their mental injury claim. Denial of 
much needed indemnification seems arbitrary and unreasonable, and is 
violative of the constitutional right to due process.  
                                                                                                                     
 194. An individual, case-by-case determination would far better serve the legislative intent 
of the law, as it would ensure coverage for legitimate claimants while keeping the burden on the 
claimant to ultimately prove her injury, deterring disingenuous claims. 
 195. See Subsection III.C.1. 
 196. FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (2016); Tucker, supra note 19, at 280. 
 197. See Subsection III.C.1. 
 198. For an explanation of why the cost of indemnification for first responders who sustain 
purely mental injury would be marginal, see Subsection III.C.2. 
 199. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 448 (Fla. 2016) (using the same quoted 
language to describe the unconstitutional result of the section 440.015 presumption, in which the 
JCC was barred from assessing the reasonableness of fee awards on a case-by-case basis and 
deviating from that presumption when equity demanded). 
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No overpowering public necessity for depriving first responders the 
right to sue in tort to recover indemnification benefits can be shown. 
Therefore, the categorical denial of indemnity dictated by section 
112.1815 fails the first prong of the Westphal standard.200 Evidentiary 
and economic concerns are largely overblown in the first responder 
context. While some economic impact is unavoidable, opponents to 
expanding coverage would be hard pressed to argue that such marginal 
additional expenditure is not worthwhile. In the long term, expanding 
coverage would not only benefit employers and society as a whole by 
maintaining healthier, more diligent first responder employees,201 but 
would also allocate societal resources to a deserving and noble cause. In 
the first responder circumstance, the legislative concerns previously 
discussed do not outweigh the strong possibility that a first responder’s 
meritorious claim will be categorically barred from court and will go 
unheard and unrecompensed.  
Even if legislative concerns rose to the level of justifying a limitation 
of benefits for purely mental injury, it cannot be shown that a less harmful 
alternative does not exist as the second prong of the Westphal standard 
requires.202 Other states have taken creative approaches to the issue of 
how to handle mental–mental injuries, incorporating various criteria and 
causal nexus standards that must be satisfied before an injury may be 
compensated.203 Therefore, even if the aforementioned concerns proved 
to be overpowering, procedural and evidentiary safeguards could be put 
in place that allowed legitimate claims to be compensated while 
efficiently weeding out claims without merit. 
Because Florida Statutes section 440.11(1) dictates that workers’ 
compensation is the exclusive remedy available to claimant 
employees,204 first responders who suffer PTSD or other purely mental 
injury are unable to pursue additional recovery outside of the workers’ 
compensation system. This result frustrates the purpose of workers’ 
compensation statutes as the statutes no longer “provide ‘adequate, 
sufficient, and . . . preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured 
on the job.”205 For claimants who have a bona fide diagnosis of PTSD or 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311, 322 (Fla. 2016). 
 201. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
 202. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322. 
 203. Bailey, supra note 29, at 514–18 (discussing methods used by various states that include 
requiring mental injuries to be caused by gradual stress, or requiring that the injury-inducing stress 
be usual and/or sudden); see also Burke, supra note 51, at 909–13 (discussing how Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and New York approach mental–mental claim evaluation). 
 204. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2017). 
 205. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 315 (quoting Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (1973)); see also 
4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04 (stating that, in light of advances in knowledge about mental 
injury, any state that continues to withhold the benefits of workers’ compensation from a worker 
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other mental disorder, they are left to struggle with a serious condition 
that hinders not only their ability to perform employment functions, but 
impacts their daily lives and families as well.206 A categorical denial of 
indemnification for mental–mental injury suffered by first responders 
does not provide any sort of adequate or sufficient safeguards for the 
injured employee because it treats legitimate mental workplace injuries 
as if they do not exist.207 The workers’ compensation employer–
employee bargain effectively traps the employee in a state of limbo, 
resulting in an unconscionable imbalance of bargaining power. Florida 
Statutes section 112.1815 therefore does not constitute a “reasonable 
alternative”208 to tort litigation, and should be held violative of the 
constitutional guarantee of access to courts. While not a complete denial 
of all benefits, the arbitrary denial of indemnification surpasses the 
tipping point discussed in Westphal209 and crosses the line into 
unconstitutionality. 
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES & METHODS FOR EVALUATION 
Naturally, the primary change advocated for in this Note is the 
inclusion of indemnification as a benefit available to first responders who 
suffer purely mental injury such as PTSD. This change could be realized 
by simply amending the current first responder statute by adding the 
words “and indemnity” after providing for medical benefits. In addition, 
it would be useful to briefly discuss a method to be adopted by Florida 
courts that would assist with handling these types of claims. In light of 
Florida’s apprehension and resistance to allowing such mental injury 
claims, the proposed method may offer some guidance that further 
mitigates concerns surrounding mental–mental claims. This Part provides 
a model statute to be adopted by the Florida legislature as well as a 
general methodology for evaluating mental injury claims of first 
responders. 
A.  Model Statute 
The fix is an easy one. The definition of the term “first responder” 
provided in the current Florida first responder workers’ compensation 
statute is already adequate, and sufficiently covers all individuals at a 
heightened risk of being exposed to traumatic or stress-inducing 
                                                                                                                     
does “unjustifiable violence to the intent of the workers’ compensation act, for reasons that are 
without support in either legal or medical theory”). 
 206. Burke, supra note 51, at 907. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322. 
 209. Id. at 323. 
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stimuli.210 However, if concern over the breadth of the statute persists, a 
new definition can be constructed to encompass only first responders who 
have been exposed to specific stimuli or traumatic experiences.211 The 
advocated change addresses section 112.1815(1)(3) of the statute, that 
currently states “only medical benefits . . . shall be payable for mental or 
nervous injury” and “payment of indemnity . . . may not be made unless 
a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies 
the mental or nervous injury.”212 To adequately and equitably compensate 
first responders who suffer this type of injury, the statute should be 
changed to read: “medical benefits and indemnity . . . shall be payable for 
mental or nervous injury” and the provision specifically addressing a 
denial of indemnity should be deleted.213 Additionally, a provision should 
be added to further define “indemnity” to clarify what specific benefits 
fall under the purview of that term. Lastly, legislators would be wise to 
add an additional provision to section 440.093 that summarizes the first 
responder exception to claiming mental or nervous injuries. This addition 
would ensure that no conflict remains between section 112.1815 and 
section 440.093. These changes would ensure first responders who suffer 
proven and legitimate claims of PTSD or other mental injury will be fully 
and fairly compensated for their injury and the purpose of the workers’ 
compensation statutes will be fulfilled.  
B.  Suggested Methodology for Mental–Mental Injury 
Claim Evaluation 
An ideal methodology for reviewing first responder mental–mental 
injury claims would be one that incorporates both subjective and 
objective components. Such a method would mitigate the concern of 
malingering and fraud, yet still allow claimants who genuinely believe 
they have suffered a legitimate mental injury their day in court and a 
chance at redress. In short, the new standard of reviewing mental injury 
claims, such as a claim of PTSD, would first involve the subjective 
determination of whether the first responder genuinely believes that he 
suffered a legitimate mental illness caused by workplace stimuli. Judicial 
fact finders would hear testimony presented by the claimant and experts 
                                                                                                                     
 210. FLA. STAT. § 112.1815(1) (2017) (defining “first responder” under the statute as a law 
enforcement officer, a firefighter, or an emergency medical technician or paramedic employed by 
the state or local government, including volunteers). 
 211. Criteria from particular mental injuries could be selected from the DSM-IV and DSM-
V to accomplish this. See DSM-V, supra note 38, at 271 (listing examples of PTSD-inducing 
traumatic events). 
 212. § 112.1815(1)(3). 
 213. Id. § 112.1815(3) (“However, payment of indemnity as provided in s. 440.15 may not 
be made unless a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies the mental 
or nervous injury.”). 
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and determine whether or not the employee’s belief is legitimate. Then, 
the judge would objectively determine through the evidence and 
testimony presented whether, by clear and convincing evidence,214 the 
mental injury was actually caused215 by workplace stimuli. 
When evaluating an employee’s workers’ compensation claim it 
should be imperative that she actually believed she sustained a legitimate 
injury. It may seem obvious, but inevitably courts will have to hear a 
claimant’s statements regarding the seriousness of the injury sustained, 
and substantiation of those statements is the first step in preventing fraud 
and abuse of the workers’ compensations system. The Michigan 
legislature, for example, adopted an approach in 1978 that if a claimant 
factually establishes that he honestly believes some personal injury 
incurred during the ordinary course of his employment and that his 
employment caused his disability, then the claimant is entitled to 
compensation.216 With such a standard, the fact finder uses a “subjective 
approach focus[ing] on whether the claimant is being honest or is 
malingering.”217 This is where the malingering factors discussed in 
Subsection III.C.1 and other DSM-V criteria will come into play. This 
“subjective causal nexus”218 test alone is flawed, however, because of its 
failure to take into account whether an injury was actually objectively 
sustained, and whether the injury was actually caused by stimuli in the 
workplace, a fundamental tenet of the workers’ compensation system.219 
The whole point of the workers’ compensation system is to compensate 
employees for injury sustained while at work; such a goal would be 
unduly frustrated by not requiring a claimant to prove workplace stimuli 
was the underlying cause of their injury.220 While requiring the claimant 
to prove she actually believes she suffered a mental injury is important, 
                                                                                                                     
 214. Id. 
 215. Using the same causal nexus standard cited in Florida Statutes section 440.093 that the 
workplace stimuli “must be and remain the major contributing cause of the mental or nervous 
condition and the compensable physical injury as determined by reasonable medical certainty 
must be at least 50 percent responsible for the mental or nervous condition as compared to all 
other contributing causes combined.” § 440.093(2). 
 216. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475 (referencing the Michigan Supreme Court decision in 
Deziel v. Difco Labs, Inc., 394 Mich. 466 (1975) that prompted the legislative adoption in 1978). 
The Michigan legislature discontinued that adopted standard by 1982, however. 4 LARSON, supra 
note 53, § 56.04 (amending the standard to reflect an objective component: that “mental 
disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded 
perceptions thereof”). 
 217. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475; see also 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04 (stating that 
at the heart of the Deziel decision was the notion that, if the claimant honestly, albeit mistakenly 
believed he sustained disability due to a work injury, the resulting disability should be 
compensable). 
 218. 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04. 
 219. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475, 483. 
 220. Id. at 483. 
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an objective standard of reviewing that belief and for determining the 
causal nexus aspect of the claim is critical. 
Therefore, the second component of the proposed standard is an 
objective determination of whether the claimant actually sustained 
verifiable injury, and whether the injury sustained was objectively caused 
by workplace stimuli. This test poses a significantly more difficult hurdle 
for claimants to clear than just simply proving they believe they sustained 
a compensable injury. As previously discussed, a battle of the experts and 
other evidentiary proof is necessary to determine whether the claimant 
suffered a legitimate mental injury and whether the injury was caused by 
workplace stimuli.221 Fact finders will be tasked with objectively 
evaluating a claimant’s mental state, and should lean heavily on 
psychology and psychiatry experts well versed with the most recent 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in fulfilling this 
task.  
New Jersey adheres to this objective standard of review,222 making no 
distinction between physical and mental injuries, but requires a claimant 
to produce “objective evidence that supports a medical diagnosis of 
psychiatric disability” to support his claim of mental disorder and a 
workplace causal connection.223 In articulating this standard, a New 
Jersey court framed the issue as “not whether a workers’ compensation 
claimant malingered,” but instead focused primarily on whether the 
“stress, admittedly subjective, stemmed from objectively proven stressful 
work conditions, rather than conditions which only the petitioner found 
stressful (or, perhaps, conditions which were not shown objectively to 
exist at all).”224 Other states have also adopted different wrinkles to their 
objective-causal-nexus standards. In addition to requiring objective 
evidence of mental injury and a causal nexus to workplace stimuli, 
Pennsylvania requires the workplace incident to have been an “abnormal 
                                                                                                                     
 221. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
 222. Burke, supra note 51, at 901. New Jersey’s standard has been dubbed “the Goyden Test” 
and includes five prongs that must all be met before an injury, physical or mental, may be 
compensated: 
 
(1) the working conditions must be objectively stressful, (2) there must be 
evidence showing that the claimant responded to them as stressful, (3) the 
objectively stressful working conditions must be ‘peculiar’ to the work 
environment, (4) there must be objective evidence supporting a medical 
opinion of the resulting psychiatric disability in addition to the ‘bare statement 
of the patient,’ and (5) the workplace exposure must have been a ‘material’ 
cause of the disability. 
 
Id. at 901–02. 
 223. Id. at 911. 
 224. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475–76 (quoting Goyden v. State Judiciary, 256 N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 438 (1991)). 
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working condition.”225 Under this additional requirement, a claimant 
would be unable to recover for mental injury caused by a particular event 
if that employee received specific training for that type of event, or if that 
event was common for the type of work the employee does.226 Such a 
requirement could have obvious applicability to the first responder 
circumstance, though unfettered speculation of what is a foreseeable 
event for first responders engaged in dangerous work could have negative 
implications.227 New York employs a similar standard, requiring the 
stress inducing accident to be “greater than an ordinary work 
environment.”228  
No matter what standard the Florida legislature adopts, an objective 
component is critical, as it helps prevent fraudulent claims while allowing 
workers with genuine mental injury a form of redress.229 While 
observation of a claimant may establish subjective belief in mental or 
emotional disability,230 the causal nexus between observable and 
verifiable symptoms must also be established. To establish such 
causation, an objective standard of review is necessary.  
CONCLUSION 
First responders are an integral part of disaster relief efforts, and when 
disaster strikes, the affected localities expect first responders to be ready 
and willing to assist, even if it means putting their own well-being at risk. 
While it is true that first responders take on this selfless responsibility 
voluntarily, at minimum they should have assurances that, in the event 
they develop adverse health conditions related to their emergency 
response duties, they will be adequately compensated by workers’ 
compensation benefits. The Florida legislature must reconsider its stance 
on first responder mental injury, and provide first responders with 
adequate and complete support. We as a society have a duty to take care 
of the men and women who have selflessly volunteered to take care of 
us.  
                                                                                                                     
 225. Burke, supra note 51, at 909–10 (“Although there is no bright-line test for abnormal 
working conditions . . . claims have been denied if a claimant received training for a certain type 
of event or if such an event was foreseeable for the type of work at issue.”). 
 226. Id. at 910 (providing the example of a convenience store clerk who was given training 
on how to handle armed robberies, and concluding that a subsequent armed robbery would likely 
fail the abnormal working condition test because of its foreseeability and the prior training the 
employee received). 
 227. In the case of Officer Realin, this requirement could lead to litigation over whether a 
mass shooting, and removal of bodies of victims from that shooting, was foreseeable for his line 
of employment. 
 228. Burke, supra note 51, at 912. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475. 
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